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To investigate the external validity of laboratory results, we combine a public good 
experiment with three treatments in a field experiment. One treatment offers the opportunity 
to free-ride, the other two are placebo treatments. We compare results within subjects. In the 
free-riding treatment, subjects who contribute little in the lab are less productive. This effect 
is quantitatively as important as the effect of ability. The correlation between lab and field 
disappears in the two placebo treatments. We conclude that we can use lab experiments to 
learn about behavior in situations that share the game form but not necessarily the frame. 
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To explain behavior observed in laboratory experiments, economists have extended game
theory to include heterogeneous, non-standard preferences.1 One basic prediction of such
models with stable preferences is that individuals behave consistently across similar game
forms within and outside the lab. Consistent with this prediction, within subject correlation
of behavior between lab and ﬁeld settings has been documented.2 In this paper, we present
such evidence for the class of public good games that economists see as a metaphor for
problems such as teamwork, free-riding, and contributions to a common good. We show
that contributions in a lab public good game correlate with eﬀort in a teamwork task in the
ﬁeld. For this task, we are able to generate quantitative estimates, allowing us to compare
the impact of our measure of cooperativeness on productivity to the impact of ability.
An implicit but so far untested assumption in this line of work is that the correlation
obtains because the lab and the ﬁeld share the same strategic situation (game form); it
could, however, be the case that lab experiments pick up other mechanisms such as norms
about behavior in groups or broader fairness concerns that operate independent of the exact
strategic situation. To test this alternative hypothesis, we add two placebo treatments
that share the frame but not the game form with the original set-up. Averaging over the
two placebo treatments, we document that the correlation disappears, suggesting that the
correlation is indeed driven by the strategic situation.
As the ﬁrst part of our study we run a ﬁeld experiment and hire temporary employees
(henceforth: clerks) to register books in a university library. In doing so, we conduct a
natural ﬁeld experiment as participants do not know that they participate in an experiment
and work in a natural environment.3 In the end, we invite them back for a lab experiment
in which they play a public good game.
In the ﬁeld, the clerks register books into a computer system. The clerks work in groups
of four for a ﬁxed wage. In the main treatment (Group) they can free-ride on the other
group members’ eﬀorts as they can leave as soon as the group has entered a pre-speciﬁed
number of books. In this treatment, the underlying game form is similar to the public
good experiment insofar as employees have an incentive to free ride — yet, the framing
between lab and ﬁeld is diﬀerent. We correlate contributions in the lab with eﬀort in the
ﬁeld (“within subject”). We measure eﬀort as productivity (books per minute) corrected
for ability. To do so we divide the books-per-minute score by the result of a typing speed
test (letters per ﬁve minutes) that job candidates had to perform when they applied for
1Examples for such theories include but are not limited to reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger 2004, and Falk and Fischbacher 2006), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999 and Bolton
and Ockenfels 2000), or the preference formulation of Charness and Rabin (2002).
2See, e.g., Karlan (2005), Benz and Meier (2008), or Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011). However, recently
the discussion whether results obtained in laboratory settings can be readily extrapolated to ﬁeld settings
has intensiﬁed. See e.g., the papers by Levitt (2007), List (2007), or Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2011).
3See John List’s classiﬁcation at http : ==www:fieldexperiments:com=
1the job. We document that in the Group treatment, those clerks provide more eﬀort that
also contribute more in the laboratory public good game.
If we impose some additional structure, we can show that the eﬀects are economically
meaningful: In the Group treatment, choosing a clerk who contributes one additional
standard deviation in the lab, results in a 11% higher productivity (corresponding to a
0.54 standard deviation increase). Choosing a clerk with a one standard deviation better
test score results in 13% higher productivity. I.e., selecting clerks on ability and fairness
(lab contributions), has an impact of a similar order of magnitude. This seems to be broadly
consistent with the priorities applied in real world hiring practices.4
The correlation between the contribution in the laboratory public good game and the eﬀort
in the ﬁeld may be due to the same underlying game form in the lab and in the ﬁeld or
to some features in the framing that trigger similar behavioral responses. To distinguish
between these two channels we run two additional placebo treatments where there is no
scope to free-ride but that share the otherwise identical frame with the Group treatment.
In the ﬁrst placebo treatment (Single), each employe can leave as soon as he or she has
entered a certain number of books, independent of the performance of the other group
members. In the second placebo treatment (No Incentives), the clerks can leave after
a ﬁxed period of time, no matter how many books they or the other group members have
entered. We ﬁnd that in the two control treatments, taken together, there is no correlation
between contributions in the lab and eﬀort in the ﬁeld. If we analyze the two control
treatments separately we obtain a clear zero correlation in the No Incentives treatment
and a weak positive correlation (p-value around 9%) in the Single treatment.
Analyzing the ﬁeld results in more detail, we show that incentivizing clerks has ambiguous
eﬀects depending on group heterogeneity with regards to ability: If we compare productivity
conditional on the testscore, we ﬁnd no improvement going from the No Incentives to the
Single treatment. But if we control, by treatment, for group heterogeneity (within group
standard deviation of the testscore), we ﬁnd a large positive eﬀect of the Single treatment
for groups that are more homogenous than the average; for heterogeneous groups, however,
incentives backﬁre, as heterogeneity has a negative eﬀect in the Single treatment, but
not in the other two. While our experiment was not designed to analyze this particular
eﬀect, we hypothesize that this eﬀect is driven by the fact that the Single treatment is the
only treatment to rank the group members explicitly in terms of task completion. Thus,
lagging group members realize how much slower they are than their coworkers and their
motivation drops oﬀ. Barankay (2011) documents in a ﬁeld experiment with a diﬀerent
context a similar strong negative eﬀect of rankings.5
4See for example Rosse et al. (1991) or Dunn et al. (1995) for studies on the relative importance of
diﬀerent characteristics in hiring decisions.
5Meidinger et al. (2003) analyze the relation of team heterogeneity and productivity in a laboratory
experiment. They show that workers are better able to cooperate when the team is homogeneous.
2While we do not suggest that we can always extrapolate from game forms in the lab to
“similar” game forms in the ﬁeld, we interpret our results as encouraging news that this
practice can be useful.6 We uphold this interpretation even given the uneven results over
the two placebo treatments: if the correlation was driven by the the frame, e.g. the fact
that the subjects always work or play in groups of four, it should appear over all three
treatments. In the No Incentive treatment, however, we clearly observe no correlation.
The potential correlation between the public good experiment and eﬀort in the Single
treatment would be consistent with certain aspects of preferences (types) being correlated;
e.g., altruistic types that forego free-riding possibilities could also be less competitive and,
therefore, immune to being ranked.
Related Literature: Many variations of the classic public good experiment, Kim and
Walker (1984) and Isaac et al. (1985), have been conducted to check the stability of the
outcomes. For a survey of early variations, see the survey in the Handbook of Experimental
Economics by Ledyard (1995) or the survey by Fehr and Gaechter (2000).
Recently, a few papers relate behavior in the lab and in the ﬁeld. Karlan (2005) document
that behavior in a laboratory investment game predicts repayment of microﬁnance loans
one year later. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) combine laboratory and ﬁeld observations of the
same individuals, for example, of ﬁshermen who face a common pool resource dilemma and
Benz and Meier (2008) match laboratory observations to donations data from the University
of Zurich. These papers also ﬁnd a positive correlation between ﬁeld and lab behavior, but
they do not have control and treatment groups in the ﬁeld. Palacios-Huerta and Volij
(2008) document that soccer players play mixing strategies both in penalty shootouts and
experimental matching pennies games, and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) document
that chess grand masters play the Nash equilibrium in centipede games. These papers ﬁnd
similar strategic behavior in lab and ﬁeld tasks, but there is selection into the ﬁeld task
(professional athletes and chess players). Moreover, Levitt et al. (2010) are not able to
replicate the ﬁndings of these studies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the exper-
imental set-up for the ﬁeld and the lab study. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4
discusses the results and concludes.
6One of the reasons why public good experiments have received a lot attention in the lab experimental
is that the simple public good game serves as a powerful metaphor for many economic situations which
involve free riding, as classic public goods, intellectual property rights for informational goods, or team
production in organizations.
32 Experimental Set Up
2.1 General
As the ﬁrst part of our study we hire temporary workers to register books in a university
library. As the clerks work in a natural work environment and do not know that they
participate in an experiment, it is a natural ﬁeld experiment. At the end of the ﬁeld exper-
iment we pay the subjects their wage and invite them to come to our lab and participate
in a lab experiment roughly two weeks later. We still do not reveal to the subjects that
they participated in a ﬁeld experiment. In the lab, subjects play a public good game and
answer a questionnaire.
2.2 Field Experiment
The ﬁeld experiment took place between October 1 and October 21 of 2008 at the Economics
Department of the University of Munich. We recruit 103 subjects to register books in
an institute library. These clerks have to enter books’ information into an Excel-based
computer database. We advertise the positions as one-time half-day jobs via posters all
over the university campus, in student dorms, and on internet job portals. We promise to
pay a salary of e55 and give the job duration as “up to 5 hours”. Applicants have to apply
via a recruiting website where they enter demographic information, contact details, and
complete a ﬁve minute typing test. The test mirrors their actual task: they are displayed
pictures with book information which they must type into an online form.
A research assistant (RA) invites the applicants to come to our library at a speciﬁc date
and time. Every day we have subjects come in two shifts, the morning shift starting at
8:30am and the afternoon shift starting at 1:30pm. Each shift consist of a group of four
individuals. We allocate subjects to shifts on a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve base subject to the
constraint that we avoid putting participants with the same last name, the same address
or the same major into the same shift. We instruct our RAs to look for signs of prior
relationship (eg. joint arrival, etc.), but do not observe any.
The RA welcomes every shift and explains the task to the group. He shows them the
shelves with the books they have to enter, before leading each one of them to one of four
adjacent but separate oﬃces. In their oﬃce, the participants ﬁnd a laptop computer with an
opened Excel-based entry mask. All entries subjects make in the Excel mask are saved on
a central log ﬁle so we can track their performance over time. In principle, it is possible for
the subjects to talk and interact, but we observe no signs of more than casual interaction.
Our RA brings the books to the oﬃces of the four subjects and gives them feedback on
their performance every 30 minutes. See Figures 4, 5, and 6 in Appendix B for pictures of
the physical set up.
All subjects in one shift are allocated to one of three treatments.
4Group: All subjects can leave once they have registered 680 books as a group.7 The
feedback every 30 minutes is given with respect to group progress (“In the last 30
minutes the group entered x books. So in total the group has entered y out of a total
of 680 books.”). In this treatment “private return from eﬀort < social return” holds.
Single: Each subject can leave once it has registered 170 books individually. The
feedback every 30 minutes is given with respect to individual progress (“In the last
30 minutes you entered x books. So in total you have entered y out of a total of 170
books.”). In this treatment “private return from eﬀort = social return” holds.
No Incentives: All clerks must work 3.5 hours, irrespective of the number of books
entered. The feedback every 30 minutes is given with respect to individual progress
(“In the last 30 minutes you entered x books. So in total you have entered y books.”).
In this treatment “private return from eﬀort = 0” holds.
In the Group treatment, purely egoistic sujects should free ride, as the social beneﬁt
from eﬀort is larger than the private beneﬁt. In contrast, in Single and No Incentives
treatments there is no scope for free riding as there is no diﬀerence between private and
social beneﬁts from eﬀort. We keep the 30 minute feedback structure constant across all
treatments to avoid confounding the true treatment variation with perceived variations in
monitoring.
Only at the end of the experiment one of us introduces himself (truthfully) as academic
staﬀ responsible for the library organization. He pays the participants, tells them about the
opportunity to participate in paid laboratory experiments at MELESSA (Munich Exper-
imental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences), and invites them to experimental
sessions roughly two weeks after the ﬁeld experiment.8 Subjects can either directly sign
up for a session or leave their email address to be contacted a few days before the sessions
take place.
2.3 Laboratory Study
Between October 28 and 30 — about 10 days after the end of the ﬁeld experiment — we
run ﬁve sessions of laboratory experiments at MELESSA in Munich. About half of our
subjects from the ﬁeld (49) come to the lab. Exactly one half of the participants in the
Single treatment show up, as well as 48 % in the No Incentives and 46 % in the Group
treatment; we do not expect non-random selection of our ﬁeld subjects into the lab and a
Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis that the participation probability
7In the ﬁrst sessions we had one session with 120 books and 2 sessions with 150 books per person.
People were substantially faster than we expected so we increased the number of books to 170 per person.
8We deliberately chose to become visible only at that stage, to avoid that subjects made the link between
the laboratory study and the prior employment.
5is the same over the three groups (p-value: 0.93). We ﬁll up the sessions with students
from the MELESSA subject pool. The subjects were invited via ORSEE, Greiner (2004),
and the experiment was implemented with zTree, Fischbacher (2007). In total we have 84
subjects (4*16 and 1*20) in the lab.
Each session lasts roughly 90 minutes and the average earnings are 23.85e. In each session
we run six rounds of experiments. Rounds 4-6 are fully anonymous, but rounds 1-3 are
not. In these non fully anonymous rounds, we randomize group composition for each of the
rounds. Before the round starts, we lead all subjects out of the room, to lead them back in
as a group of four telling them that they play together. Thus subjects know who is in their
group, but do not know which group member does what in the experiment. We designed
this treatment to resemble the ﬁeld situation where clerks are welcomed and introduced as
a group. In the fully anonymous treatments, we reshuﬄe groups randomly in each round
and subjects can neither see the members of their group nor know who does what within
the group.
In rounds 1 and 4 we run two standard public good games.9 In this linear public good
experiment subjects play in groups of four, get an initial endowment of 20 tokens, and must
decide how many tokens they put into a common pool. Tokens in the pool are multiplied
by 1.6 and distributed among the group members. Tokens outside the pool belong to
the subject. This game is repeated ten times with the same groups (partner treatment).
Therefore, purely egoistic players should contribute nothing while it is eﬃcient to contribute
20. At the end of the experiment, subjects answer a short questionnaire.
3 Results
3.1 Overview of Lab and Field Results
Before we analyze the relationship between the lab and the ﬁeld experiment, we summa-
rize the results of each stage separately. In both, the non-anonymous (PG1) and the fully
anonymous (PG2), lab public good games we replicate standard results: Subjects dif-
fer substantially in their contributions, but even initially they contribute less than 20 on
average before they reduce their contributions over time. In Figure 1 we plot the average
contribution levels over the ten periods for PG1 on the left and PG2 on the right. In PG2,
subjects initially contribute more (restart eﬀect), but then they reduce their contributions
again. We obtain a relatively small restart eﬀect, but it is confounded by a treatment vari-
ation between the ﬁrst and the second round: In the ﬁrst round subjects knew with which
other subjects they were in one group; in the second round, they did not. As we know
from Fehr and Gaechter (1999) subjects contribute more if they meet the other people in
9In rounds 2, 3, 5, and 6 we run a diﬀerent experiment; its design is described in Appendix C. We do
not use the results of these experiments in our analysis.
6their group before the experiment. This may explain why subjects contributed less in the
second round, a behavior that looks like a smaller restart eﬀect. In Figure 2 we present the
average contributions combining PG1 and PG2. We use the average contribution over all
20 periods as our main measure of lab contributions. As discussed below, our results are
robust to using diﬀerent measures.
Contributions are not aﬀected by participation or treatment assignment in the ﬁeld. On
average over PG1 and PG2, subjects contribute 7.9. The subjects from the MELESSA
subject pool contribute slightly more (8.4) than the participants in the ﬁeld experiment
(7.6); this diﬀerence, however, is not signiﬁcant (p-value Mann-Whitney U-test: 0.28).
Participants in the Single treatment contribute slightly more (7.9) than participants in
the No Incentives or Group treatments, who contribute almost exactly the same (7.4);
a Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis that contributions are the same
over the three groups (p-value: 0.99).
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the eld experiment. We assigned slightly
more subjects to the main Group treatment. We obtain an odd number of subjects in
the No Incentives treatment because one session comprised only three subjects as one
clerk failed to show up. We get less than 170 in the average number of books entered in
the Group treatment because we ran the ﬁrst three sessions with 120 or 150 books. We
get less than 170 in the Single treatment because one subject had not ﬁnished his share
of books after ﬁve hours (the advertised maximum working time) and we allowed him to
leave. Subjects entered the highest number of books in the No Incentives treatment
where also the variance in performance was highest. We have about two thirds of women
in all our treatments.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Field
Total Group Single No Incentives
Number of Subjects 103 44 32 27
Number of Females 73 32 20 21
Avg. Speed (books/minute) 0:901 0:904 0:913 0:882
Std.Dev. Speed 0:199 0:182 0:217 0:211
Avg. # of Books entered 171:05 165:18 169:00 183:04
Std.Dev. Books entered 32:89 34:85 7:29 44:28
In Figure 3 we plot our measure of adjusted speed over time. We calculate adjusted speed
as a measure of eﬀort by dividing speed (books per minute) by the testscore (characters
per two minutes). We plot the typing speed for the ﬁrst two hours because even the fastest
participants worked for at least two hours. In later hours, the fastest participants in the
Single treatment were already ﬁnished so that we cannot compare average speeds. We
































Figure 1: Avg. Public Good Contribution per Period
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Figure 2: Avg. Public Good Contribution per Period (Sum PG1 + PG1)
the participants received feedback on their and the group’s progress.
We ﬁnd that adjusted speed changes little over time. In all three treatments subjects
seem to improve their performance a little initially so that they work faster in the second
and third 30 minute period. In the Single and No Incentives treatment, the subjects
continue to work as fast or even faster in the last period, while we ﬁnd a slight drop oﬀ
in the last period in the Group treatment. Overall, however, we ﬁnd little dynamic over
time. Therefore, for the rest of this paper, we abstract from dynamic eﬀects and present








































Figure 3: Skill Adj. Speed for the First Two Hours in the Field (
Books=Minute
Testscore ), by treatment
One period equals 30 Minutes, total time two hours
A casual inspection of Figure 3 seems to suggest that there is little diﬀerence between the
treatments in the ﬁeld experiment. While this is true for the averages, we will demonstrate
in the remainder of the paper that distinct countervailing eﬀects combine to produce these
averages.
3.2 Correlation Lab and Field
In this section, we demonstrate qualitatively that subjects’ behavior in the Group treat-
ment, which allows free riding, is correlated with their lab behavior. At the same time
the subject’s behavior in the other two treatments, which do not allow free riding, is not
signiﬁcantly correlated with their lab behavior.
Various game theoretic models with stable (fairness) preferences make clear predictions
for our set-up: Subjects with a preference for fairness contribute more in a public good
game in the lab than subjects who have purely egoistic preferences. The same prediction
holds for the Group treatment, in which subjects can free ride, i.e. work slowly, so that
the other group members have to enter more of the books assigned to the group. No such
prediction holds for the other two treatments (Single and No Incentives), as in both
cases the work load of the other group members is independent of how fast another member
works.
9As the theoretic prediction for the lab-ﬁeld-correlation is the same for the Single and the
No Incentive treatments, we initially pool the results from the two treatments into the
category No Group. Because we obtain a larger sample size for the No Group treatment
compared to the two single treatments, this makes it more diﬃcult for us to reject the null
hypothesis that there is no correlation in the No Group treatments.





Full Sample Group No Group
Kendall 0:1650 0:3789 0:0419
(0:0961) (0:0212) (0:7640)
Spearman 0:2351 0:5654 0:0389
(0:1039) (0:0094) (0:8411)
N. obs. 49 20 29
Notes: An observation is one subject present in the ﬁeld and in the lab. Kendall and Spearman rank
correlation coeﬃcients between average public good contribution over 20 periods (PG1 + PG2) and
(Books/Minute)/Testscore; Testscore: Letters per 5 Minutes; In parenthesis Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj
respectively
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”
In Table 2 we present the Kendall and Spearman correlation coeﬃcients between the
average contribution over all twenty periods in the two rounds in the lab experiment and
the average adjusted speed in the ﬁeld. For the full sample (column (1)) we ﬁnd a slight
correlation that is, however, not signiﬁcant. If we split the treatments into Group and
No Group, we ﬁnd that there is almost no correlation in the No Group treatment. In
the Group treatment however, we ﬁnd a very strong correlation at least at the 5% level
for both tests.
To put our results in perspective, we can compare them to ﬁndings from social psychology:
Ross and Nisbett (1991), for example, argue that it is very hard to “predict” behavior
based on information about personality traits; they report correlations between behavior
and traits not exceeding 0.3. If we interpret the lab contribution as a measure of some
personality trait, we ﬁnd much stronger correlations (between 0.4 and 0.6 in the relevant
comparisons), suggesting a much better predictability of behavior.
In Table 3, we present the results for a three way split, i.e., we separately list the correlation
coeﬃcients for the Single and the No Incentives treatment. In the No Incentives
treatment we obtain a clear zero correlation and in the Single treatment a weak positive
correlation with a p-value around 9%. Still, if the correlation was driven by the the frame
as opposed to the game form it should appear over all three treatments. We will discuss
later on the role of heterogeneity and competition for the results of the ﬁeld experiment.
Though our experiment was not designed to diﬀerentiate along this dimension, one potential
explanation for the weak correlation between the public good experiment and eﬀort in the





Group Single No Incentives
Kendall 0:3789 0:3250  0:0256
(0:0212) (0:0868) (0:9512)
Spearman 0:5654 0:4356  0:0854
(0:0094) (0:0917) (0:7815)
N. obs. 20 16 13
Notes: An observation is one subject present in the ﬁeld and in the lab. Kendall and Spearman rank
correlation coeﬃcients between average public good contribution over 20 periods (PG1 + PG2) and
(Books/Minute)/Testscore; Testscore: Letters per 5 Minutes; In parenthesis Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj
respectively
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”





Full Sample Group Single No Incentives
Kendall  0:0198 0:0782  0:1331  0:0399
(0:7338) (0:3896) (0:2206) (0:7524)
Spearman  0:0340 0:1330  0:2234  0:0666
(0:7331) (0:3894) (0:2191) (0:7413)
N. obs. 103 44 32 27
Notes: An observation is one subject present in the ﬁeld. Kendall and Spearman rank correlation coef-
ﬁcients between decision to participate in the lab experiment and (Books/Minute)/Testscore; Testscore:
Letters per 5 Minutes; In parenthesis Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj respectively
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”
Single treatment would be a correlation of certain aspects of preferences (types), e.g.,
altruism with a lack of competitiveness.
Our results hold up if we use diﬀerent measures of lab or ﬁeld performance. We obtain
essentially identical results if we measure performance not as all books entered but as only
correctly entered books. We report the main results for this approach in Table A-1 in
Appendix A. Again, we get identical results with slightly more noise if we measure lab
contributions by only one of the two public good games (see Table A-2 in Appendix A)
As a robustness check (Table 4), we present the Kendall and Spearman correlation co-
eﬃcients between participation in the lab experiment and the average adjusted speed in
the ﬁeld. We ﬁnd no correlation between performance in the ﬁeld and lab participation,
neither for the whole sample nor for any of the treatments. Hence we do not suspect any
selection into lab participation along this dimension either.
113.3 Regression Analysis of Lab and Field Relationship
In this section, we impose more structure and run a regression analysis to quantify the
impact of the diﬀerences in fairness preferences as measured by the lab contributions;
we ﬁnd the impact to be large. We estimate two speciﬁcations with OLS, where each
observation, indexed by i, is one subject that we have observed in the ﬁeld and in the lab.
In the main speciﬁcation, we distinguish Group and No Group treatments and estimate
speedi = 0 + 1IGroup + 2scorei + 3contri + 4contriIGroup + "i;
where speedi is the log of the average speed (in books per minute), IGroup is an indicator
variable that takes on the value 1 if the subject participated in the Group treatment in
the ﬁeld and 0 otherwise, scorei is the log of the testscore (in characters in ﬁve minutes),
and contri is the log of the average contribution to the public good over the two rounds.
Note, that we no longer use our skill adjusted speed measure but control for ability directly
in the regression. All standard errors are robust and clustered by ﬁeld sessions.
In addition, we use a speciﬁcation with a three way split:
speedi = 0+1IGroup+2ISingle+3scorei+4contri+5contriIGroup+6contriISingle+"i;
where ISingle is an indicator variable that is 1 if the subject participated in the Single
treatment in the ﬁeld and 0 otherwise.
Qualitatively, we get the same results from the regression (Table 5) as from the correlation
coeﬃcients: Average speed is signiﬁcantly correlated with lab contributions in the Group
treatment, but neither in the No Group treatments taken together, nor in the Single
or No Incentive treatments separately, i.e. we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that
contributions do not predict speed in the Single treatment at the 5% level, even if we
impose the additional parametric structure of the regression, which increases the power of
the test. In addition, we can demonstrate that our typing speed test captures a meaningful
part of ability as the testscore is highly correlated with average speed.
We use the coeﬃcient estimates of the main speciﬁcation to obtain a measure of the
economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀects: A one standard deviation increase in the log average
contribution (67.0%) increases average speed by 10.8% in the Group treatment. We can
compare this with the eﬀect of the testscore: A one standard deviation increase in the log
testscore (28.0%) increases speed by 12.9%, i.e., if subjects have the possibility to free ride
in the ﬁeld, selecting them on the basis of their lab contributions yields basically the same
productivity advantage as selecting them on the basis of ability, i.e., the testscore.
12Table 5: OLS Estimates of the Average Speed in the Field Experiment
Books per Minute (Log)
Two Way Split Three Way Split




Testscore (Log) 0:461 0:467
(0:108) (0:114)
Avg. Contribution (Log)  0:002  0:029
(0:026) (0:021)
Avg. Contribution (Log)  Group 0:161 0:191
(0:074) (0:074)




N. obs. 49 49
R2 0:451 0:486
Notes: An observation in the regression is one subject present in the ﬁeld and in the lab. The dependent
variable is log of Books/Minute. Robust standard errors (clustered by ﬁeld session) in parenthesis
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”
4 Discussion and Conclusion
4.1 What type of subjects drive our results?
We can shed some more light on the motivations of the people who contribute in the lab
and in the ﬁeld. Results from various lab studies suggest that there is a (small) fraction of
subjects who are genuinely willing to contribute, often called altruists. These subjects will
typically contribute even in the last round. There are also other subjects who contribute as
long as they believe that others contribute. These may be either purely egoistic subjects,
strategic egoists, who contribute in the early rounds for strategic reasons to increase the
contributions of others or genuine conditional cooperators who are willing to cooperate as
long as others cooperate. In general, both of these latter types are observationally almost
equivalent and in equilibrium contribute initially but reduce their contributions towards
the end, leading to the downward-sloping pattern of average contributions.
To analyze which of the two groups drives the correlation between the lab and the ﬁeld,
we correlate productivity in the ﬁeld with the contribution levels in the ﬁrst periods of
the two rounds of the lab game and the last periods of the two rounds. If conditional





First Periods Last Periods
Group No Group Group No Group
Kendall 0:3579 0:0320 0:2316 0:0493
(0:0292) (0:8215) (0:1600) (0:7200)
Spearman 0:5435 0:0237 0:3335 0:0547
(0:0132) (0:9029) (0:1508) (0:7781)
N. obs. 20 29 20 29
Notes: An observation is one subject present in the ﬁeld and in the lab. Kendall and Spearman rank
correlation coeﬃcients between sum (PG1+PG2) of the public good contribution in the ﬁrst periods (1)
respectively last periods (10) and (Books/Minute)/Testscore; Testscore: Letters per 5 Minutes; In paren-
thesis Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj respectively
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”
cooperators and strategic egoists drive the correlation, we should ﬁnd the correlation for the
ﬁrst round but not for the last round. But if genuine altruists are behind the correlation,
we should observe a signiﬁcant correlation for both periods. In Table 6 we present the
correlation coeﬃcients for the the ﬁrst and last periods. In neither speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant correlation in the No Group treatments. In the Group treatment, however,
we ﬁnd a correlation between ﬁrst period contributions and adjusted speed in the ﬁeld but
no signiﬁcant correlation with the last period contributions. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that strategic egoists and conditional cooperators drive the lab-ﬁeld-correlations.
4.2 Regression Analysis Field: Group Heterogeneity
In this section, we return to the question why incentives have seemingly so little impact on
productivity in the ﬁeld experiment. We show that incentivizing clerks by allowing them
to leave early if they work faster, has ambiguous eﬀects on productivity depending on
group heterogeneity with regards to ability: Incentives may even backﬁre in heterogeneous
groups.
To investigate this hypothesis in a regression analysis, we need a measure of group het-
erogeneity. We cannot use the standard deviation of actual performances for obvious en-
dogeneity problems. Instead, we use the standard deviation of testscores. We include for
each subject the standard deviation of testscores in his or her group together with the
(log)level of the testscore of the individual subject. We interact the standard deviation of
the testscore with the treatment dummy, as we suspect that heterogeneity plays an espe-
cially important role in the Single treatment as it is the only treatment to rank the group
members in terms of task completion.
In Table 7 we present the results of this regression. We ﬁnd that the point estimates of
14Table 7: OLS Estimates of the Average Speed in the Field Experiment







Std. Testscore (Log)  0:012
(0:061)
Std. Testscore (Log)  Group  0:075
(0:083)






Notes: An observation in the regression is one subject present in the ﬁeld. The dependent variable is log
of Books/Minute. Robust standard errors (clustered by ﬁeld session) in parenthesis
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”
the coeﬃcient on the standard deviation of testscores is negative in all three treatments:
heterogeneous groups perform worse. But the size of the eﬀect varies over treatments. It is
very small for the No Incentive treatment, somewhat larger for the Group treatment,
and by far largest for the Single treatment. It is statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% level)
only in the Single treatment.
If we control for group heterogeneity, we get diﬀerent estimates of the treatment dummies.
These dummies now capture the treatment eﬀect for a group that has an average degree of
homogeneity. We ﬁnd that the point estimates are now positive for the Group treatment
(which provides some incentives) and even more positive for the Single treatment (which
provides the strongest incentives). Only the coeﬃcient for the Single treatment is signiﬁ-
cant (at the 5% level). The point estimates are large, in particular for the eﬀect of Single
treatment relative to the No Incentives treatment, implying a strong increase in speed
if we go from No Incentives to the Single treatment.
These results suggest that heterogeneity and incentives interact to produce the at ﬁrst
glance counterintuitive impact of our treatments. Because we do not select or group the
participants in the ﬁeld experiment on the basis of their testscores, some of the groups
are very heterogeneous with regards to ability. This heterogeneity does not translate into
15diﬀerences in payment or working time in the Group and No Incentive treatments;
everybody is paid the same and everybody comes and leaves together. In the Single
treatment, however, some subjects have to work much longer than others: In some groups
the fastest clerk can leave after two hours, while his or her slower coworkers have to work
for up to ﬁve hours. Even if the subjects cannot directly see each other working, they
notice when one of their coworkers leaves and their motivation drops oﬀ. As this eﬀect can
only happen in the Single treatment, we suspect that this eﬀect may drive the seeming
ineﬀectiveness of incentives in our ﬁeld experiment.
We did not design our experimental set-up to explicitly answer the reasons behind the
strong eﬀect of heterogeneity. It could be that the slow members of a group feel unfairly
treated because they must work much longer for the same amount of money than the fast
members. Therefore, they may experience a decrease of motivation. Maybe, the Single
treatment introduces a notion of competition that motivates group members that work at
a similar speed, but discourages laggards. Whatever the reason for the interaction eﬀects
of treatment and heterogeneous ability, the eﬀects are large. Whenever we introduce incen-
tives, we reward not only eﬀort but also ability, and we know little how this is perceived by
workers, as most lab experiments abstract from heterogeneous ability. Our results suggest
that this interaction should be added to the growing list of potential pitfalls associated
with the provision of explicit incentives.
4.3 Summary
We run a public good experiment in the ﬁeld and in the lab with (partly) the same subjects.
The ﬁeld experiment is a true natural ﬁeld experiment as subjects do not know that they
are exposed to an experimental variation. Our study oﬀers several contributions. We
can establish that lab behavior is externally valid, as behavior in the lab and in the ﬁeld
correlates, even within subjects. We can go beyond the existing literature, as we have
treatment and control groups in the ﬁeld. Using the placebo treatments, we can show that
the correlation is only present in the public good treatment (Group) but not in the other
treatments (Single, No Incentives). I.e., subjects behave similarly under “similar”
incentive structures. We take this as indication for the external validity of laboratory
experiments. This might also be indicative for the existence of stable preference types.
Furthermore, the simple game theoretic structure of the public good game seems to capture
important aspects of real life situations. Moreover, we can show that the eﬀect of “fairness”
preferences on performance is economically relevant, in our setting comparable in size to
the eﬀect of ability. Finally we document the (detrimental) eﬀect of heterogeneity w.r.t.
ability on performance under explicit incentive structures.
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Full Sample Group No Group
Kendall 0:1480 0:3368 0:0271
(0:1358) (0:0410) (0:8511)
Spearman 0:2190 0:5368 0:0318
(0:1307) (0:0147) (0:8700)
N. obs. 49 20 29
Notes: An observation is one subject present in the ﬁeld and in the lab. Kendall and Spearman rank
correlation coeﬃcients between average public good contribution over 20 periods (PG1 + PG2) and (Correct
Books/Minute)/Testscore; Correct Books: Core Information without typing mistakes; Testscore: Letters
per 5 Minutes; In parenthesis Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj respectively
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”





First Public Good Game (PG1) Second Public Good Game (PG2)
Group No Group Group No Group
Kendall 0:3158 0:1133 0:3421  0:1207
(0:0553) (0:3984) (0:0378) (0:3677)
Spearman 0:4891 0:1311 0:4761  0:1562
(0:0286) (0:4980) (0:0338) (0:4184)
N. obs. 20 29 20 29
Notes: An observation is one subject present in the ﬁeld and in the lab. Kendall and Spearman rank
correlation coeﬃcients between average public good contribution over 10 periods in PG1 or PG2 respectively
and (Books/Minute)/Testscore; Testscore: Letters per 5 Minutes; In parenthesis Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj
respectively
* = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** = “signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”
We present Kendall and Spearman Rank Correlation Coeﬃcients between a subject’s average
contribution and her/his skill adjusted speed measured as (Books/Minute)/Testscore where Testscore is
the result of our ability test upon hiring separate for contributions in PG1 and PG2. In parenthesis we
report Prob > jtj and Prob > jzj respectively. Stars denote signiﬁcance: * = “signiﬁcant at 5%”; ** =
“signiﬁcant at 1%”; *** = “signiﬁcant at 0.1%”.
19Appendix B Set-Up of the Field Experiment
Figure 4: Workspace
Figure 5: Oﬃce location
Figure 6: Books that had to be entered
20Appendix C Instructions: Laboratory Experiment
Instructions (translated from German)
Welcome to the experiment and thanks a lot for your participation! From now on, please do not
speak to other participants of this experiment any more!
General remarks on the procedure
This experiment serves to analyze economic decision making. You can earn money by taking part,
which will be paid in cash after the experiment. During the experiment, you and other participants
are asked to make decisions. Both your own decisions as well as those of other participants will
determine your pay-oﬀ according to the following rules. The whole experiment lasts about 90
minutes. You will receive detailed instructions at the beginning. If you have questions regarding
the instructions, please raise your hand. One of the conductors of the experiment will then come
to you and answer your question personally. Each participant receives a ﬁxed ID number by which
he or she is identiﬁed during the experiment. During the experiment, we do not speak in terms
of Euro, but Experiment-Points (EP). Your earnings will be calculated in EP in the course of the
experiment. At the end of the experiment, all EPs you have earned will be converted into Euro
using the following exchange rate:
1 Experiment-Point = 2 Euro-Cent
At the End: The experiment consists of 6 parts. It ends after the 6th part. The results from
the individual rounds will be added up and converted into Euro. Your earnings will be paid out
after the 6th part.
Anonymity: In each of the 6 parts, you will play in a new group. In each part your group
will be re-matched randomly. Sometimes you know who is in your group, sometimes you do not.
The other participants do not know during nor after the experiment which role you have taken
or how much you have earned. We will evaluate the data from the experiment anonymously and
delete all your personal and person-related information as soon as we have matched the data. At




Groups: At the beginning of part 1 you will be randomly divided into groups of four. In each
later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You can see the other members of your
group. But you cannot attribute decisions to other group members. Thus all group members stay
anonymous. The 1st part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds in total. The composition of
the group stays the same over the whole 1st part.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Each participant receives 20 Points in the beginning
of each round. You can freely divide the points into two alternatives, X and Y:
1. You can put 0 to 20 points into pot X. The sum of the points in pot X will be multiplied
by 1.6 and distributed equally among the group members. That is, for each point in pot
X you will get 0.4 (=1.6/4) points. For example, if the sum of the points in pot X in your
group is 60, each group member will get 60*0.4=24 points from pot X. If all group members
together contribute 10 points to pot X, you and all other group members will get 10*0.4=4
EP from pot X.
212. You can put 0 to 20 points into pot Y. This amount goes then one-to-one into your earnings.
So if you, for instance, contribute 6 points to pot Y, you get exactly 6 points. Your earnings
per round is then the sum of your earnings from pot X and that from pot Y.
In mathematical terms, the result is:
Result (for member i) = (20   xi) + (S  1:6)=4
xi is the contribution of member i to pot X
S is the sum of the contributions of all group members to pot X
You will be asked on the screen how many points you want to contribute to pot X. The rest of
the 20 points automatically goes to pot Y. Therefore, it is not possible to save points. You can
enter only an integer number between 0 and 20 (i.e. 0; 1; 2; ...; 19; 20). After each round you
will get to know the contributions of your group members to pot X and your total earning in this
round in EPs. In the course of part 1 you will make 10 decisions according to the instructions
above. Please remember: You will receive 20 points in each round, which you have to distribute
to pot X and Y.
You will determine your deposit with the slider (See Figure 7). A click on the right-arrow
increases your deposit by 1 point, whereas a click on the left-arrow reduces your deposit by 1
point.
You will get the instructions for the 2nd part of the experiment after end of the 1st part.
Part 2
Groups: At the beginning of part 2 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You can see the other
members of your group. But you cannot attribute decisions to other group members. Thus all
group members stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: In this 2nd part, each group has to deposit a sum
of 240 points into a pot. The game ends as soon as the group has raised these 240 points. In the
beginning, each member receives a budget of 220 points. From these points you must deposit at
least 10 per round into the group pot. You can increase your contribution in steps of 2.5 points
up to 60 points. If the necessary 240 points have not been deposited after a certain round, the
experiment goes to the next round and you can again choose your contribution. The experiment
continues to move to further rounds until the number of deposited points in the group pot reaches
240. For each round played, expenses of 20 points will be subtracted from every member.
Consider the following case:
In the ﬁrst and second round the participants have deposited altogether 180 points into the group
pot. This means that at the beginning of the 3rd round there are still 60 points to be raised. In
the third round, two participants contribute 10 points each and the other two pay in 15 points
each. Then, at the beginning of the 4th round, the number of points still to be raised decreases
to 10 points (=60 points - 2*10 points - 2*15 points). In addition, the budget of the participants
who have contributed 15 points decreases by 35 points (15 points contribution and 20 points
expenses per round). The budget of the participants who have contributed 10 points decreases
by 30 (10 points contribution and 20 points expenses per round). If in a round the participants
raise more points than the total necessary amount, the points and the expenses will be subtracted
proportionally from each participant.
Consider the following case:
At the beginning of the third round, the participants have deposited altogether 180 points into
22the group pot. So they still need to raise 60 points. If now in the third round each participant
deposits 30 points, then the total contribution would be 120 instead of the 60 points needed. In
this case, the budget of each participant decreases on a pro-rata basis only by 15 points (=60/120
* 30 contributed points) and the 10 (=60/120 * 20) points of expenses for this round.
In the end you will get as payoﬀ the points that remain from your budget after the last round.
You will be asked on the screen how many points you want to contribute to the group pot. You
can enter a number between 10 and 60 in steps of 2.5 (i.e. 10; 12.5; 15; ...; 57.5; 60). After each
round you get to know the sum of the contributions of your group members to the group pot and
your remaining budget in experiment points.
You determine your deposit with the slider (See Figure 8). A click on the right-arrow increases
your deposit by 2.5 points, whereas a click on the left-arrow reduces your deposit by 2.5 points.
You will get the instructions for the 3rd part of the experiment after the end of the 2nd part.
Part 3
Groups: At the beginning of part 3 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You can see the other
members of your group. But you cannot attribute decisions to other group members. Thus, all
group members stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 2.
Part 4
Groups: At the beginning of part 4 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You will not come to
know the other members of your group, neither during nor after the experiment. So your decisions
stay anonymous. The 4th part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds in total. The composition
of the group stays the same for the whole 4th part.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 1.
Part 5
Groups: At the beginning of part 5 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. In each later part your group will be re-matched randomly. You will not come to
know the other members of your group, neither during nor after the experiment. So your decisions
stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 2.
Part 6
Groups: At the beginning of part 6 you will be randomly assigned to a new group of four
participants. You will not come to know the other members of your group, neither during nor
after the experiment. So your decisions stay anonymous.
Budget and alternatives in each round: Same as in part 2.
23Figure 7: Screenshot: Decision Screen for Part 1 and 4
Figure 8: Screenshot: Decision Screen for Part 2,3,5, and 6
Figure 9: Screenshot: Exit Questionnaire
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